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Disability,	  Rationality,	  and	  Justice:	  	  
Disambiguating	  Adaptive	  Preferences1	  
Jessica	  Begon,	  University	  of	  Oxford	  
jessica.begon@nuffield.ox.ac.uk	  	  
This	  is	  a	  slightly	  longer	  draft	  of	  a	  chapter	  forthcoming	  in:	  The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  
Philosophy	  and	  Disability,	  David	  Wasserman	  and	  Adam	  Cureton	  (eds.),	  (Oxford	  
University	  Press).	  If	  citing,	  please	  use	  the	  final,	  published	  version.	  	  
	  
A	   growing	   body	   of	   evidence	   suggests	   that	   the	   self-­‐reported	   welfare	   levels	   of	  
disabled	   individuals	   are	   no	   worse,	   and	   sometimes	   better,	   than	   that	   of	   non-­‐
disabled	  people.	  This	  is	  so	  surprising	  to	  individuals	  without	  disabilities,	  many	  of	  
whom	   consider	   the	   prospect	   of	   becoming	   disabled	   as	   one	   of	   the	   greatest	  
misfortunes	  that	  can	  befall	  us,	  that	  it	  has	  been	  called	  the	  ‘disability	  paradox’.2	  Yet	  
not	  only	  do	  disabled	  individuals	  rate	  their	  subjective	  quality	  of	  life	  highly,	  many	  
also	  resist	  the	  suggestion	  that	  their	  conditions	  should	  be	  cured,	  and	  refuse	  cures	  
when	   offered;	  many	   argue	   for	   the	   right	   to	   have	   disabled	   children,	   and	   against	  
policies	   of	   pre-­‐natal	   screening	   for	   various	  disabilities;	   they	  march	   in	  Disability	  
Pride	  parades,	  and	  insist	  that	  disabled	  lives	  are	  not	  inherently	  worse	  than	  non-­‐
disabled	  lives.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  idea	  of	  disability	  as	  tragic	  remains	  the	  common-­‐
sense	  view	  amongst	  most	  able-­‐bodied	  (and,	  indeed,	  some	  disabled)	  people.	  	  
	  
Faced	  with	  such	  a	  divergence	  of	  views,	  whom	  should	  we	  trust?	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  
it	  may	  seem	  that	  disabled	  people	  are	  far	  better	  placed	  to	  understand	  the	  realities	  
of	   living	  with	  their	  conditions	  and	  that,	  as	  such,	   it	   is	   their	  testimony	  we	  should	  
rely	  on.	  Yet,	  on	  the	  other,	  we	  may	  think	  that	  disabled	  individuals’	  experience	  is	  
exactly	  what	  gives	  us	  reason	  to	  doubt	  their	  testimony.	  It	  is	  widely	  acknowledged	  
that	   in	   conditions	   of	   great	   hardship	   or	   deprivation	   individuals	  may	   cope	  with	  
their	   circumstances	   by	   claiming	   to	   prefer	   and,	   indeed,	   coming	   to	   prefer,	   their	  
situation	   to	   any	   alternative.	   However,	   such	   ‘adaptive	   preferences’	   need	   not	  
constitute	  decisive	  evidence	  that	  these	  conditions	  are	  not,	  in	  fact,	  deplorable.	  We	  
do	  not,	  then,	  consider	  women’s	  support	  of	  patriarchal	  norms	  to	  justify	  them,	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  For	   helpful	   comments	   and	   discussion	   on	   earlier	   drafts	   of	   this	   paper	   I	   would	   like	   to	   thank	  
audiences	  at	  the	  Centre	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Social	  Justice	  (CSSJ)	  Seminar	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Oxford,	  
and	   the	   CELPA	   Seminar	   at	   the	   University	   of	   Warwick,	   as	   well	   as	   Cécile	   Fabre,	   Carl	   Fox,	   Alex	  
Geddes,	  and	  Katy	  Wells,	  and	  the	  editors	  of	  this	  volume,	  Adam	  Cureton	  and	  David	  Wasserman.	  	  
2	  Albrecht	  and	  Devlieger	  1999	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an	   abused	   partner’s	   preference	   to	   remain	   in	   the	   relationship	   to	   mitigate	   this	  
abuse.	   Along	   similar	   lines,	   we	   may	   claim	   that	   disabled	   individuals’	   apparent	  
satisfaction	   with	   their	   lives	   is	   not	   reliable	   evidence	   against	   the	   claim	   that	  
disability	  must	  be	  disadvantageous.	  	  	  
	  
This	   might	   seem	   like	   a	   neat	   solution:	   if	   disabled	   individuals’	   preferences	   are	  
simply	   hopelessly	   deformed	   by	   the	   terrible	   circumstances	   in	  which	   they	  were	  
formed,	   then	  we	  can	   treat	   their	  positive	  claims	  about	  disability	  as	  suspect,	  and	  
maintain	  our	  intuition	  that	  it	  is	  a	  tragedy	  after	  all.3	  It	  is	  certainly	  a	  solution	  that	  
allows	   many	   people	   to	   maintain	   their	   strongly	   held	   intuitions.	   However,	   we	  
should	  be	  cautious	  about	  simply	  ignoring	  the	  preferences	  and	  beliefs	  of	  a	  group	  
who	   are	   already	   subject	   to	   considerable	   injustice.	   The	   unjustified	   silencing	   or	  
mistrust	  of	  already	  underrepresented	  groups	  may	  constitute	  a	  serious	  epistemic	  
injustice,	  quite	  apart	  from	  the	  possibility	  of	  being	  used	  to	  justify	  interference	  in	  
their	   lives	   and	   choices.	   There	   has,	   on	   this	   basis,	   been	   a	   considerable	   backlash	  
against	   the	   tendency	   amongst	   Western	   feminists’	   to	   see	   women	   in	   the	   third-­‐
world	  as	  the	  ‘dupes	  of	  patriarchy’,	  whose	  preferences	  can	  be	  ignored.4	  Elizabeth	  
Barnes,	   too,	   has	   argued	   against	   adaptive	   preference	   models	   of	   disabled	  
individuals’	  preferences	  on	   the	  basis	   that	  when	   “misapplied…[they]	   can	  simply	  
entrench	  pre-­‐existing	  biases”5.	  	  
	  
However,	   such	  worries	  about	   its	  misapplication	  should	  not	   lead	  us	   to	  abandon	  
the	   concept	   of	   adaptive	   preferences	   entirely.	   If	   we	   were	   to	   simply	   take	  
individuals’	  claims	  to	  be	  satisfied	  with	  their	  lot	  at	  face	  value,	  this	  may	  mean	  that	  
mistreatment,	   injustice,	  and	  oppression	  would	  not	  be	  recognised	  or	  rectified.	   If	  
those	   subject	   to	   oppression	   do	   not	   identify	   their	   own	  mistreatment,	   they	  may	  
not	  be	  entitled	  to	  redress.	  Indeed,	  it	  may	  not	  be	  considered	  mistreatment	  at	  all,	  
since	  ‘no	  one	  complains’.	  Thus,	  some	  balance	  needs	  to	  be	  struck	  between	  taking	  
individuals’	  positive	  assessment	  of	  their	  quality	  of	  life	  and	  their	  preferences	  for	  
their	  current	  way	  of	  being	  as	  definitive,	  and	  ignoring	  them	  entirely.	  	  
	  
A	   further	   problem	   with	   diagnosing	   adaptive	   preferences,	   less	   frequently	  
acknowledged,	  is	  the	  vagueness	  of	  the	  term,	  and	  the	  breadth	  of	  the	  phenomena	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  My	  focus	  is	  cases	  where	  merely	  preferring	  a	  life	  with	  an	  impairment	  is	  thought	  to	  cast	  doubt	  on	  
the	   reliability	   of	   an	   individual’s	   testimony.	   Thus,	   I	   am	   concerned	   with	   physical	   and	   cognitive	  
impairments	   that	   are	   not	   considered,	   in	   themselves,	   to	   undermine	   an	   individual’s	   capacity	   for	  
autonomous	   agency,	   and	   so	   do	   not	   consider	   the	   issues	   raised	   by	   severe	   cognitive	   impairment	  
(nor	  take	  a	  view	  on	  which	  should	  be	  considered	  ‘severe’).	  	  
4	  Narayan	  2002:	  418.	  Also,	  Khader	  2011,	  2012,	  2013;	  Jaggar	  2005.	  	  
5	  Barnes	  2016:	  137	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can	   be	   used	   to	   cover.	   From	   the	   opening	   paragraph	   we	   can	   see	   the	   various	  
experiences	   and	   attitudes	   that	   can	   be	   roughly	   grouped	   –	   and	   rejected	   –	   as	  
adaptive	  preferences,	  despite	  the	  fact	  they	  cannot	  all	  be	  plausibly	  interpreted	  as	  
preferences.	   Further,	   we	   might	   reasonably	   think	   that	   if	   our	   concern	   is	  
adaptation,	  then	  all	  preferences	  formed	  in	  response	  to	  our	  circumstances	  should	  
also	   be	   included.	   It	   should	   be	   clarified	   from	   the	   outset,	   then,	   that	   ‘adaptive	  
preferences’	  as	  the	  term	  is	  used	  in	  the	  literature	  (hereafter	  APs)	  is	  both	  broader	  
and	  narrower	  than	  an	  intuitive	  understanding	  of	  the	  concept.	  Broader	  because	  it	  
includes	   not	   just	   preferences,	   but	   something	   like	   ‘evaluative	   states’ 6 ;	   and	  
narrower	   because	   it	   includes	   only	   those	   adaptations	   that	   are,	   in	   some	   sense,	  
unreliable.	   However,	   even	   accepting	   these	   restrictions,	   ambiguity	   remains:	   in	  
particular,	  concerning	  what	  constitutes	  relevant	  unreliability.	  	  
	  
My	  goal	   in	  this	  paper	   is	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  problems	  of	  both	  misapplication	  and	  
vagueness.	   By	   clarifying	   the	   various	   phenomena	   loosely	   categorised	   as	   APs	   I	  
show	  that	  correctly	  diagnosing	  an	   individual’s	  preference	  as	  adaptive	  need	  not	  
constitute	  epistemic	  injustice,	  nor	  insultingly	  malign	  their	  capacities	  as	  a	  rational	  
agent,	   and	   further,	   that	   our	   account	   of	   relevantly	   unreliable	   APs	   should	   be	  
sensitive	  to	  our	  particular	  goals	  and	  context.	  Thus,	  no	  single	  account	  of	  APs	  will	  
be	  satisfactory	   for	  all	   the	  purposes	  to	  which	   it	   is	  put.	  Our	  diagnosis	  of	  APs	  will	  
depend	  both	  on	  the	  role	  these	  preferences	  play	  (for	  example,	  being	  used	  to	  fill	  in	  
the	  contents	  of	  a	  theory	  of	  justice,	  or	  to	  generate	  an	  account	  of	  well-­‐being),	  and	  
on	   how	   information	   about	   preferences	   is	   extracted	   (from	   individuals’	   choices,	  
expressed	   satisfaction,	   or	   expressed	   counterfactual	   preferences).	   Thus,	   an	  
individual	  may,	   for	   example,	   be	   a	   reliable	   guide	   to	   their	   well-­‐being,	   but	   not	   a	  
reliable	  guide	  to	  what	  they	  are	  owed	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  distributive	  justice	  (and	  vice	  
versa);	   they	   may	   be	   a	   reliable	   guide	   to	   the	   content	   of	   their	   distributive	  
entitlements,	  but	  not	  to	  whether	  they	  have	  had	  these	  entitlements	  met;	  and	  their	  
choices	  and	  apparent	  satisfaction	  may	  be	  unreliable	   in	  all	   these	  regards,	  whilst	  
their	  expressed	  counterfactual	  preferences	  are	  not.	  It	  would	  be	  a	  mistake,	  then,	  
to	   distinguish	   individuals	  whose	   preferences	   are	   adaptive	   from	   those	  who	   are	  
not;	   and	   a	   mistake,	   too,	   to	   distinguish	   preferences	   that	   are	   adaptive	   (for	   all	  
purposes,	  in	  all	  contexts)	  from	  those	  that	  are	  not.	  	  
	  
In	   particular,	   I	   defend	   a	   distinction	   between	   ‘well-­‐being	   adaptive	   preferences’	  
(WBAPs),	  and	  ‘justice	  adaptive	  preferences’	  (JAPs).	  WBAPs	  are	  APs	  as	  classically	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  As	  Terlazzo	  (2015:	  1)	  notes,	  the	  term	  incorporates	  both	  “comparative	  preferences	  proper”	  and	  
“non-­‐comparative	  states	  like	  desires,	  judgements	  of	  values,	  etc.”.	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understood:	   individuals	  adapt	   to	  constrained	  options	   in	  ways	   that	   render	   their	  
resulting	   preferences	   procedurally	   irrational	   and	   non-­‐autonomous,	   and	   so	  
undermine	  their	  possessor’s	  authority	  about	  their	  own	  well-­‐being.	  In	  the	  context	  
of	   social	   justice,	   however,	   this	   account	   is	   both	   over	   and	   under-­‐inclusive:	   it	  
includes	   preferences	   that	   do	   not	   warrant	   state	   interference,	   and	   excludes	  
preferences	  that	  are	  a	  rational	  response	  to	  our	  circumstances,	  yet	  should	  not	  be	  
allowed	   to	   inform	   a	   theory	   of	   justice.	   Thus,	   I	   contend	   that	   we	   also	   need	   to	  
identify	   JAPs:	   preferences	   that	   are	   a	   poor	   guide	   to	   individuals’	   entitlements.	  
Some	   of	   these	   are	   rational	   (and	   so	   not	   also	   WBAPs),	   whilst	   others	   are	   both	  
justice	   and	   well-­‐being	   adaptive.	   JAPs	   and	   WBAPs,	   then,	   are	   overlapping	   but	  
distinct	   categories.	   I	   elaborate	   on	  my	   understanding	   of	  WBAPs	   (§1)	   and	   JAPs	  
(§2),	  and	  argue	  that	  both	  concepts	  are	  needed	  to	  understand	  the	  different	  ways	  
in	  which	   individuals’	  preferences	  may	  be	  unreliably	  adaptive,	  and	   the	  different	  
responses	  that	  may	  be	  appropriate.	  
	  
Whilst,	  I	  argue,	  not	  all	  APs	  are	  irrational	  they	  are	  all	  non-­‐autonomous.	  Thus,	  we	  
may	  worry	  that	  the	  account	  remains	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  objection	  that	  diagnosing	  
APs	  has	  the	  insulting	  implication	  that	  individuals	  are	  defective	  agents	  or	  ‘dupes’.	  
However,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  First,	  in	  many	  cases	  APs	  are	  a	  rational	  response	  to	  
unjust	   circumstances.	   In	   these	   instances,	   autonomy	   is	   undermined	   by	   the	  
limitation	  of	  circumstances	  rather	  than	  defects	  in	  individuals’	  capacities.	  Second,	  
all	   (or	  almost	  all)	  of	  us	  possess	  some	  WBAPs:	  preferences	  we	  hold	   for	   reasons	  
that	   are	   necessarily	   opaque	   to	   us.	   That	   some	   of	   these	   are	   relevant	   to	   justice	  
(JAPs)	  –	  and	  thus,	  are	   justifiably	   ignored	  in	   formulating	  a	  theory	  of	   justice,	  and	  
may	   legitimate	   state	   interference	   –	   is	   again,	   I	   argue,	   not	   the	   result	   of	   faulty	  
individual	  capacities,	  but	  of	  circumstances.	  Thus	  in	  clarifying	  the	  concept	  of	  APs,	  
I	  will	  also	  demonstrate	  that	  being	  diagnosed	  as	  having	  an	  AP	  need	  not	  have	  the	  
insulting	  implications	  ordinarily	  supposed.	  	  
	  
1.	  Autonomy,	  Proceduralism,	  and	  Well-­‐Being	  Adaptation	  
	  
1.1	  Adaptation	  and	  the	  Political	  Project	  
	  
Classic	  accounts	  of	  APs	  –	  developed	  by	  Jon	  Elster	  and	  his	  critics	  –	  are	  modelled	  
on	   Aesop	   and	   La	   Fontaine’s	   ‘Fox	   and	   Grapes’	   parable.7	  On	   realising	   he	   cannot	  
reach	  the	  grapes	  he	  desires,	  the	  fox	  insists	  ‘grapes	  are	  too	  sour	  for	  foxes’,	  and	  he	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  For	  example,	  Elster	  1987;	  Bovens	  2002;	  Colburn	  2011;	  Barnes	  2009.	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did	  not	  want	   them	  anyway.	   It	   is	   assumed	   this	   response	   is	   irrational,	   and	  not	  a	  
reflection	   of	   his	   best	   interests.	   These	   accounts	   root	   this	   irrationality	   in	  
procedural	  flaws	  in	  the	  process	  of	  preference	  formation.	  They	  focus	  on	  capturing	  
the	  idea	  –	  central	  to	  our	  intuitions	  about	  the	  fable	  –	  that	  the	  fox’s	  preference	  is	  
unreliable	   because	   he	   is	   unconsciously	   ‘fooling	   himself’:	   he	   has	   failed	   to	  
acknowledge	   his	   limitations,	   or	   recognise	   that	   the	   real	   reason	   he	   no	   longer	  
prefers	  grapes	  does	  not	  concern	  their	  sourness.	  If,	  instead,	  the	  fox’s	  response	  to	  
being	  unable	  to	  reach	  the	  grapes	  were	  to	  consciously	  cultivate	  a	  preference	  for	  a	  
sweeter,	   lower-­‐hanging	   fruit,	   this	  would	   not	   be	   an	  AP,	   but	   conscious,	   rational,	  
and	  autonomous	  character	  planning.	  
	  
When	   the	   problem	   of	   APs	   was	   raised	   in	   the	   context	   of	   social	   justice	   (notably	  
development	  ethics)	  it	  might	  have	  been	  natural	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  APs	  referred	  
to	  were	  of	  this	  procedurally-­‐flawed,	  ‘sour	  grapes’	  form	  –	  especially	  given	  the	  lack	  
of	  a	  clear	  alternative	  account.	  Yet	  examples	  used	  in	  the	  literature	  belie	  this:	  “the	  
hopeless	   beggar…the	   dominated	   housewife,	   the	   hardened	   unemployed…[who]	  
take	  pleasures	  in	  the	  small	  mercies	  and	  manage	  to	  suppress	  intense	  suffering	  for	  
the	   necessity	   of	   continued	   survival”8	  are	   not	   obviously	   ‘fooling	   themselves’.	  
Indeed,	  in	  many	  cases	  individuals	  seem	  well	  aware	  of	  their	  suffering,	  and	  make	  
considerable	   conscious	   effort	   to	   suppress	   it.	   Moreover,	   there	   are	   cases	   where	  
preferences	  are	  unconsidered,	   yet	  do	  not	   seem	   to	  be	  a	  matter	  of	   social	   justice,	  
nor	  to	  warrant	  public	  mistrust	  or	  political	  interference.	  Thus,	  we	  may	  mistrust	  a	  
woman’s	  unconsidered	  preference	  to	  undergo	   female	  genital	  cutting	  (FGC),	  but	  
not	   a	   similarly	   unconsidered	   preference	   not	   to	   undergo	   FGC.	   Indeed,	   we	   may	  
mistrust	  a	  choice	  to	  undergo	  FGC	  that	  is	  procedurally	  autonomous	  and	  rational,	  
if	   it	   is	  made	  against	  unjust	  background	  conditions	  –	  for	  example,	  as	  a	  means	  to	  
marriage,	  which	  in	  turn	  is	  necessary	  for	  economic	  security	  and	  social	  status.	  	  
	  
We	  may,	  therefore,	  be	  tempted	  to	  conclude	  that	  when	  thinking	  about	  APs	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  social	  justice,	  these	  procedural	  accounts	  are	  useless.	  Indeed,	  this	  is	  the	  
conclusion	   those	   writing	   in	   this	   context	   have	   come	   to.	   Serene	   Khader,	   for	  
example,	  has	  argued	  against	  such	  accounts	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  they	  will	  lead	  us	  to	  
mistrust	   preferences	   that	   are	   not	   “worthy	   of	   public	   interrogation” 9 ,	   thus	  
generating	   conclusions	   inconsistent	  with	   our	   intuitions.10	  Drawing	  on	  Khader’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Sen	   1988:	   45-­‐46.	   See	   Khader	   (2011:	   8-­‐10;	   42-­‐46)	   for	   discussion	   of	   the	   discrepancy	   between	  
Sen’s	  examples	  and	  Elster’s	  account.	  
9	  Khader	  2011:	  75	  
10	  Khader	  2011:	  74-­‐106;	  Khader	  2009	  
6	  
work,	   Rosa	   Terlazzo	   argues	   that	   all	   accounts	   of	   APs	   must	   meet	   the	   following	  
criterion	  of	  ‘political	  efficacy’:	  	  
An	  account	  must	  provide	  us	  with	  a	  valuable	  tool	  for	  combatting	  marginalization	  
and	   oppression,	   by	   explaining	  which	   preferences	   deserve	   social	   suspicion	   and	  
why	   they	   do	   so.	   It	   must	   include	   paradigm	   cases	   of	   adaptive	   preference	   and	  
exclude	  preferences	  that	  have	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  political	  project.11	  
	  
It	   is	   true	   that	   traditional	   accounts	  will	   fail	   this	   test.	   This	   is	   unsurprising	   given	  
that	  they	  were	  never	  designed	  to	  pass	  it,	  concerned	  as	  they	  are	  with	  procedural	  
rationality	   rather	   than	   social	   justice.	   It	   is	   also	   true	   that	  we	  need	  an	  account	  of	  
APs	   that	   is	  politically	   efficacious	   –	   for	  which	   reason	   I	   offer	   an	  account	  of	   JAPs.	  
However,	   it	  does	  not	   follow	  that	   there	   is	  no	  value	   in	  maintaining	  an	  account	  of	  
APs	   as	   procedurally	   non-­‐autonomous	   and	   irrational,	   and	   so	   a	   poor	   guide	   to	  
individuals’	  interests	  –	  that	  is,	  of	  WBAPs.	  	  
	  
1.2	  Well-­‐Being	  Adaptive	  Preferences	  
	  
How,	   then,	   might	   an	   account	   of	   procedurally	   non-­‐autonomous	   preferences	   be	  
cashed	  out?	  Elster	  saw	  the	  distinctiveness	  of	  APs	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  formed	  
unconsciously,	  or	  ‘behind	  our	  backs’,	  in	  light	  of	  diminished	  options.12	  Nussbaum	  
(amongst	   others)	   has	   argued	   convincingly	   that	   Elster’s	   account	   is	   likely	   to	   be	  
over-­‐inclusive,	   demanding	   conditions	   of	   procedural	   rationality	   few	   of	   our	  
preferences	  meet.	  As	  she	  points	  out,	  we	  are	  not	  –	  and	  should	  not	  –	  be	  “suspicious	  
of	  any	  desire	  that	  is	  formed	  through	  [unconscious]	  adjustment	  to	  reality”13.	  This	  
is	  not	  simply	  the	  criticism	  that	  this	  account	  cannot	  pick	  out	  APs	  relevant	  to	  social	  
justice,	  but	  the	  broader	  claim	  that	  it	  cannot	  distinguish	  unreliable	  preferences	  in	  
any	   context.	   Too	   many	   of	   our	   preferences	   are	   unconsciously	   formed	   for	   this	  
account	   to	   be	   useful:	   “[t]he	   desire	   for	   food	   is	   not	   normally	   induced	   through	  
conscious	  hunger	   creation”14.	  This	   is	   true,	   too,	   of	  more	   significant	  preferences:	  
for	   example,	   abandoning	   our	   childhood	   career	   aspirations,	   even	   if	   we	   are	  
unconscious	  of	  the	  reasons,	  is	  not	  usually	  thought	  to	  cast	  doubt	  on	  the	  rationality	  
or	  reliability	  of	  our	  commitment	  to	  our	  adult	  occupation.	  	  
	  
However,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  Elster	  is	  really	  concerned	  with	  APs	  not	  because	  they	  are	  
unconscious,	  but	  because	  they	  lack	  autonomy.	  If	  this	  is	  so,	  then	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Terlazzo	  2015:	  5.	  Also,	  see	  Nussbaum	  2000;	  2001;	  Barnes	  2016;	  2009.	  	  
12	  Elster	  1987:	  117-­‐119	  
13	  Nussbaum	  2001:	  78	  
14	  Colburn	  2011:	  57	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clear	   account	   of	   autonomy	   is	   a	   serious	   omission	   (and	   one	   later	   authors	   have	  
tried	   to	   fill).15	  I	   focus	   here	   on	   Ben	   Colburn’s	   account,	   which	   seems	   to	   best	  
capture	   the	   cases	   we	   have	   in	   mind.	   In	   brief,	   Colburn	   argues	   that	   APs	   are	   the	  
result	   of	   ‘covert	   influences’;	   that	   is,	   the	   reasons	   for	   our	   APs	   are	   necessarily	  
hidden	   from	   us,	   such	   that	   they	   could	   not	   explain	   our	   commitment	   if	   we	  were	  
conscious	   of	   them	   –	   we	   would	   either	   adduce	   independent	   reasons	   for	   our	  
preference	   or	   repudiate	   it.	   Thus,	   the	   fox’s	   claim	   that	   grapes	   are	   sour	   could	   no	  
longer	  explain	  his	  preference	  not	  to	  eat	  them	  if	  he	  were	  aware	  that	  the	  real	  (and	  
covert)	  cause	  of	  this	  preference	  was	  their	  inaccessibility.	  	  
	  
This	   does	   not	   imply	   all	   unconsciously-­‐formed	   preferences	   are	   adaptive	   (as	  
Elster’s	  account	  seems	  to),	  nor	  that	  any	  influence	  on	  our	  preferences	  is	  suspect.	  
Rather,	  we	  should	  be	  suspicious	  of	  APs	  because	  they	  result	  from	  influences	  their	  
possessor	   does	   not,	   and	   would	   not,	   reflectively	   endorse,	   given	   their	   current	  
disposition	   and	   convictions.	   To	   possess	   such	   APs,	   then,	   is	   to	   lack	   procedural	  
rationality,	   insofar	   as	  we	   are	   acting	   for	   reasons	  we	   could	  not	   accept.	   This	   also	  
undermines	   an	   agent’s	   independence,	   since	   someone	   cannot	   be	   “deciding	   for	  
herself”16	  when	   acting	   on	   reasons	   necessarily	   hidden	   from	  her.	   If,	   for	   example,	  
we	  discover	   that	   the	   reason	  we	  have	   revised	  our	   career	   aspirations	   is	   that	  we	  
lack	   the	   talent	   to	   pursue	   our	   original	   dream,	   and	   possess	   the	   aptitude	   for	   our	  
current	  path,	  this	  need	  not	  cause	  us	  to	  doubt	  our	  goals.	  Yet	  imagine	  if	  we	  realised	  
we	   only	   abandoned	   our	   dream	   of	   being	   a	   scientist	   due	   to	   being	   subtly	  
undermined	   by	   a	   sexist	   science	   teacher.	   We	   do	   not	   endorse	   his	   view	   (that	  
‘women	  are	  not	  cut	  out	  for	  science’),	  so	  this	  could	  not	  explain	  our	  preference.	  In	  
this	   case	  we	  may	   question	   the	  autonomy	  of	  our	  apparent	  preferences,	   and	  our	  
well-­‐being	  may	  improve	  if	  we	  revised	  them.17	  
	  
We	   may	   worry	   that	   such	   an	   account	   is	   under-­‐inclusive	   when	   applied	   to	   the	  
political	   task,	   since	  many	  paradigm	  APs	   seem	   to	  be	   consistent	   in	   this	  way.	  For	  
example,	   a	   woman	   may	   internalise	   a	   complete	   set	   of	   sexist	   and	   patriarchal	  
norms,	  such	  that	  her	  acceptance	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  economic	  opportunities	  and	  rights	  to	  
political	  participation	  are	  entirely	  consistent	  with	  her	  more	  general	  views	  about	  
women’s	   capacities	   and	   proper	   role	   within	   the	   home	   and	   society.	   She	   would,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Colburn	  2011;	  2010;	  Bovens	  2002;	  Zimmerman	  2003.	  	  
16	  Colburn	  2010:	  26	  
17	  Complications	  arise	  when	  we	  have	  pursued	  a	  plan	  of	  life	  for	  a	  sustained	  time,	  since	  our	  well-­‐
being	  may	  not	  be	  improved	  by	  abandoning	  it,	  even	  if	  the	  reasons	  we	  originally	  engaged	  in	  it	  were	  
not	   ones	  we	  would	   endorse.	   If	  we	   can	   give	   independent	   reasons	   for	   our	   current	   preference	   it	  
ceases	   to	   be	   a	   WBAP	   (we	   now	   see	   more	   value	   in	   philosophy	   than	   science);	   if	   we	   cannot,	   it	  
remains	  a	  WBAP	  that	  we	  would	  be	  better-­‐off	  for	  repudiating.	  I	  return	  to	  this	  case	  below	  (§2.3).	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then,	   endorse	   the	   reasons	   for	   her	   preference:	   they	   could	   function	   as	   the	  
explanation	   for	   her	   commitment	   even	   if	   no	   longer	   hidden	   from	   her.	   Disabled	  
individuals’	  preferences,	   too,	   are	  often	   consistent	   in	   this	  way,	   so	   this	   approach	  
cannot	  be	  used	  to	  discount	  them18	  (though	  given	  that	  the	  reliability	  of	  disabled	  
individuals’	   preferences	   is	  what	   is	   at	   issue,	   it	   is	   not	   clear	  whether	   this	   should	  
count	  against	  an	  account	  of	  APs).	  	  	  
	  
In	   response,	  we	   can	   point	   out,	   first,	   that	   our	   goal	   here	   is	   not	   political:	  we	   are	  
attempting	  to	  identify	  procedurally	  non-­‐autonomous	  and	  irrational	  preferences,	  
which	  are	  an	  unreliable	  guide	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  those	  who	  have	  them.	  It	  is	  JAPs	  that	  
warrant	   public	   suspicion,	   scrutiny,	   or	   even	   intervention.	   Thus,	   accepting	   that	  
individuals	  who	   have	   internalised	   a	   complete	   set	   of	   oppressive	   norms	  may	   be	  
considered	  rational,	  and	  a	  reliable	  guide	   to	   their	   interests,	  does	  not	   imply	   they	  
are	  necessarily	  immune	  to	  such	  scrutiny	  or	  intervention,	  as	  §2	  will	  discuss.	  
	  
In	   some	   cases	   we	   can	   distinguish	   individuals’	   ‘adaptive	   choices’	   from	   their	  
counterfactual	  preferences.	  For	  example,	  a	  disabled	  individual	  may	  choose	  not	  to	  
pursue	  higher	  education	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	   institutions	   in	  which	   it	   is	  offered	  
tend	   to	   be	   exclusive	   and	   unaccommodating.	   This	  may	   be	   consistent	  with	   their	  
further	   preferences	   (not	   wishing	   to	   associate	   with	   people	   or	   institutions	   that	  
mistreat	  them),	  and	  being	  aware	  of	  their	  reasons	  need	  not	  lead	  them	  to	  change	  
their	   mind.	   However,	   they	   may	   prefer	   a	   situation	   in	   which	   accessible	   higher	  
education	   was	   available.	   In	   such	   a	   case,	   I	   contend,	   neither	   the	   choice	   nor	   the	  
preference	  should	  be	  diagnosed	  as	  a	  WBAP	  (both	  are	  rational)	  –	  yet,	  as	  §2.3	  will	  
argue,	  the	  choice	  (though	  not	  the	  preference)	  is	  justice	  adaptive.	  	  
	  
There	   are	   also	   cases	   in	   which	   individuals’	   reasons	   to	   acquiesce	   in	   their	  
mistreatment	  are	  more	  deep-­‐rooted,	  and	  are	  not	  accompanied	  by	  counterfactual	  
preferences	  for	  a	  more	  just	  alternative.	  For	  example,	  if	  the	  above	  individual	  has	  
internalised	  a	  conception	  of	  disabled	  people	  as	  ‘not	  worthy’	  of	  higher	  education,	  
they	  may	   not	   prefer	   it	   to	   be	   available	   in	   an	   accessible	   form	   since	   they	   simply	  
think	   ‘it’s	   not	   for	   people	   like	   them’.	   Further,	   the	   internalisation	   may	   be	  
sufficiently	   complete	   that	   this	   view	   coheres	   with	   their	   other	   beliefs	   and	  
preferences,	   and	   would	   not	   change	   under	   conscious	   examination.	   It	   may	   be	  
objected	   that	   this	   is	   psychologically	   implausible	   –	   experience	   of	   oneself	   and	  
others	  as	  competent	  and	  intelligent	  will	  necessarily	  be	  incongruent	  with	  such	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Barnes	  2016:	  129	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conception	   of	   disabled	   individuals.	   Nonetheless,	   it	   does	   seem	   possible	   that	  
sustained	   oppression	   could	   lead	   to	   a	   fully	   consistent	   conception	   of	   oneself	   as	  
worthless,	  at	  least	  with	  regards	  to	  certain	  opportunities.19	  	  
	  
Yet,	  in	  this	  case	  too,	  we	  should	  not	  diagnose	  this	  as	  a	  WBAP.	  The	  individual	  is	  not	  
necessarily	   unconscious	   of	   the	   reason	   for	   their	   commitment,	   and	   we	   have	   no	  
reason	   to	   doubt	   their	   authority	   regarding	   their	   well-­‐being	   given	   their	   current	  
preference	  set.20	  However,	  as	  in	  the	  previous	  case,	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  is	  not	  a	  WBAP	  
does	  not	  mean	   this	   is	  not	  a	   JAP:	   though	   this	  preference	  may	  be	  rational,	   and	  a	  
good	  guide	  to	  their	  current	  interests,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  it	   is	  fully	  autonomous,	  
or	   a	   reliable	   guide	   to	   their	   distributive	   entitlements.	   Thus,	   allowing	   that	  
individuals	   may	   be	   rational	   even	   when	   their	   self-­‐conception	   is	   seriously	  
undermined	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  their	  acquiescence	  will	  be	  deemed	  autonomous,	  
nor	  their	  underlying	  oppression	  legitimised.	  	  
	  
Before	   finishing	   this	   section	   it	   is	  worth	  briefly	   considering	  how	  my	  account	   of	  
WBAPs	   relates	   to	   Barnes’s	   ‘discordance	   view’,	   since	   hers	   is	   one	   of	   the	   few	  
accounts	  of	  APs	  developed	  directly	   in	   relation	   to	  disability.	  Barnes	   argues	   that	  
preferences	  are	  unreliably	  adaptive	  if	  there	  is	  “a	  clear	  disconnect”	  with	  “the	  rest	  
of	   the	   person’s	   life”,	   including	   “what	   produces	   things	   like	   anxiety,	   fear,	   and	  
antipathy	   in	   their	   lives”.21	  Barnes	   does	   not	   flesh	   out	   this	   approach,	   so	   it	   is	  
difficult	   to	   get	   a	   clear	   sense	   of	   how	   it	   would	   apply	   in	   practice,	   yet	   it	   seems	  
unlikely	   to	   capture	   all	   the	   cases	  we	  would	  want.	   A	   battered	  woman	  might,	   as	  
Barnes	   points	   out,	   experience	   anxiety,	   fear	   and	   depression.	   However,	   women	  
who	   have	   internalised	   more	   mundane	   forms	   of	   sexist	   oppression	   may	   not	  
experience	  such	  cognitive	  dissonance,	  yet	  this	  surely	  would	  not	  give	  us	  reason	  to	  
overlook	  it.	  Further,	  situations	  and	  conditions	  we	  on-­‐the-­‐whole	  prefer	  can	  cause	  
stress,	   anxiety	   and	   fear,	   and	   such	   preferences	   are	   not	   obviously	   unreliable.	  
Barnes	   primary	   concern	   is	   the	   epistemic	   injustice	   entailed	   by	   unwarranted	  
attributions	  of	  APs.	  Avoiding	  misdiagnosis	  is	  certainly	  important	  but,	  as	  it	  stands,	  
her	   positive	   proposal	   provides	   little	   guidance	   as	   to	   when	   AP	   diagnoses	   are	  
warranted.	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  See	  Khader	  (2011:	  13-­‐17;	  2012:	  307)	  on	  partial	  and	  complete	  losses	  of	  self-­‐worth.	  	  
20	  For	  discussion	  of	  similar	  cases,	  see	  Baber	  2007:	  199-­‐120.	  	  
21	  Barnes	  2016:	  140	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1.3	  Why	  Identify	  WBAPs?	  
	  
To	  summarise,	  WBAPs	  lack	  procedural	  autonomy	  and	  rationality	  since	  they	  are	  
the	   result	   of	   influences	   that	   agents	   are	   necessarily	   unconscious	   of. 22	  
Consequently,	   they	   are	   an	   unreliable	   guide	   to	   individuals’	   interests.	   In	   the	  
context	   of	   social	   justice	   this	   concept	   is	   over-­‐	   and	   under-­‐exclusive.	   First,	   it	  
excludes	   preferences	   that	   are	   rational,	   and	   so	  not	  WBAPs,	   but	  which	  may	  be	   a	  
poor	   guide	   to	   our	   distributive	   entitlements,	   and	   should	   be	   overlooked	   for	   the	  
purposes	  of	  justice.23	  For	  example,	  the	  preferences	  of	  disabled	  individuals	  not	  to	  
enter	  exclusionary	   institutions	  of	  higher	  education	  may	  be	  rational,	  and	  a	  good	  
guide	   to	   their	   interests	   in	   these	   unjust	   circumstances,	   but	   their	   satisfaction	  
should	  not	  imply	  justice	  has	  been	  done.	  	  
	  
Second,	  an	  account	  of	  WBAPs	  includes	  preferences	  that	  are	  irrelevant	  to	  justice.	  
The	  fox,	  for	  example,	  has	  a	  WBAP,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  an	  injustice	  the	  
state	  should	  rectify.	  As	  a	  more	  concrete	  case,	  consider	  preferences	  for	  particular	  
aesthetic	   experiences.	   Deaf	   individuals,	   for	   example,	  may	   come	   to	   prefer	   a	   life	  
without	  music	  as	  a	  result	  of	  influences	  that	  they	  would	  not	  reflectively	  endorse.24	  
I	  assume	  that	  whilst	  justice	  requires	  that	  individuals	  have	  certain	  opportunities	  –	  
maybe	   even	   opportunities	   for	   aesthetic	   experiences	   –	   it	   does	   not	   require	   that	  
individuals	   have	   every	   possible	   opportunity	   in	   such	   a	   domain,	   or	   even	   the	  
opportunities	  they	  would	  most	  prefer	  (assuming	  scarcity	  of	  resources).	  Thus,	   if	  
deaf	   individuals	   have	   access	   to	   other	   forms	   of	   aesthetic	   experience,	   their	  
inability	  to	  hear	  music	  is	  not	  a	  concern	  of	  justice,	  so	  nor	  is	  it	  a	  concern	  of	  justice	  
if	  their	  preference	  not	  to	  listen	  to	  music	  is	  a	  WBAP.	  	  
	  
Given	  that	  an	  account	  of	  WBAPs	   fails	   to	  pick	  out	  cases	  of	  adaptation	  that	  seem	  
relevant	  to	  justice,	  we	  may	  wonder	  whether	  we	  should	  follow	  in	  the	  footsteps	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  What	   does	   it	   means	   to	   be	   unconscious	   of	   the	   reasons	   for	   our	   preferences?	   Imagine,	   for	  
example,	  a	  disabled	  individual	  who	  learns,	  perhaps	  in	  therapy,	  that	  they	  have	  some	  preference	  as	  
a	  result	  of	  being	  subject	   to	  stigma.	  Yet	  despite	   ‘knowing’	   the	  primary	  cause	  of	   their	  preference	  
they	  do	  not	  attend	  to	  it,	  push	  it	  to	  the	  back	  of	  their	  mind,	  and	  deceive	  themselves	  into	  thinking	  
they	   have	   good	   reasons	   for	   this	   preference.	   There	   will	   always	   be	   borderline	   cases.	   However,	  
insofar	  as	  someone	  continues	   to	  deceive	   themselves	  about	   the	  reason	   for	   their	  preference,	  and	  
fails	   to	   take	   on	  board	   or	   internalise	   the	   additional	   evidence	   they	  now	  have,	   they	   are	   not	   truly	  
conscious	   of	   this	   influence.	   They	   are	   in	   some	   sense	   aware	   of	   the	   pernicious	   influence	   (the	  
stigma);	  yet	  continue	  to	  insist	  that	  the	  real	  reason	  for	  the	  preference	  is	  something	  else	  (‘I	  didn’t	  
want	   to	   go	   to	   university	   anyway’).	   Thus,	   this	   remains	   a	  WBAP.	   (Thanks	   to	  Adam	  Cureton	   and	  
David	  Wasserman	  for	  pushing	  me	  on	  this	  point.)	  
23	  I	   suggest	   that	   there	   are	   three	   categories	   of	   such	   preferences:	   non-­‐autonomous	   character	  
planning,	  justice	  adaptive	  choices,	  and	  the	  coherent	  internalisation	  of	  oppressive	  norms	  (§2.3).	  
24	  This	   is	   likely	  true	  of	  many	  individuals’	   tastes,	  and	  there	   is	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  those	  with	  
impairments	  are	  particularly	  vulnerable	  to	  such	  covert	  influences.	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other	  theorists	  working	  on	  APs	  in	  the	  context	  of	  social	  justice,	  and	  abandon	  any	  
attempt	  to	  identify	  such	  preferences.	  However,	  first,	  the	  arguments	  for	  doing	  so	  
tend	  to	  be	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  diagnosing	  a	  WBAP	  will	  wrongly	  imply	  
that	  its	  possessor	  is	  unusually	  irrational	  or	  unreflective,	  or	  that	  their	  preferences	  
warrant	   public	   concern	   or	   interference.	   Khader,	   for	   example,	   objects	   to	  
autonomy-­‐based	   accounts	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   they	   entail	   the	   “dangerous	   and	  
unwarranted	   empirical	   assumption…that	   people	   with	   APs	   reflect	   on	   their	  
behaviour	  less	  than	  everyone	  else”25.	  However,	  since	  WBAPs	  are	  not	  intended	  to	  
meet	  the	  criteria	  of	  political	  efficacy,	  they	  need	  not	  capture	  only	  paradigm	  cases,	  
where	   interference	   seems	   justified.	   On	   the	   contrary,	  we	   can	   acknowledge	   that	  
many	  people’s	  preferences,	  much	  of	  the	  time,	  are	  WBAPs.26	  Adopting	  an	  account	  
of	   WBAPs,	   then,	   does	   not	   require	   reaching	   the	   dubious	   conclusion	   that	   only	  
oppressed	  and	  mistreated	  individuals	  have	  them,	  nor	  that	  they	  are	  less	  reflective	  
or	  worse	  at	  reasoning,	  nor	  that	  possessing	  WBAPs	  justifies	  interference.	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	   there	   are	   positive	   reasons	   to	   adopt	   such	   an	   account.	   Most	  
obviously,	  to	  achieve	  conceptual	  clarity.	  If,	  as	  I	  contend,	  the	  term	  ‘APs’	  is	  used	  to	  
capture	  two	  distinct	  phenomena	  –	  wherein	  those	  discussing	  APs	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
social	   justice	  have	  in	  mind	  something	  quite	  different	  from	  those	  discussing	  APs	  
in	  the	  context	  of	  autonomy	  and	  rational	  choice	  –	  it	  is	  worth	  making	  this	  explicit.	  
There	  are	  also	  more	  practical	  benefits	   to	  distinguishing	  WBAPs	  and	   JAPs.	   JAPs	  
need	  not	  also	  be	  WBAPs	  but	  the	  two	  categories	  do	  overlap	  and,	  as	  §2.4	  considers,	  
we	   should	   treat	   rational	   JAPs	   differently	   from	   JAPs	   that	   are	   also	   well-­‐being	  
adaptive.27	  Drawing	  this	  distinction	  also	  makes	  clear	  that	  having	  a	  JAP	  need	  not	  
imply	  we	  are	  irrational,	  and	  that	  not	  having	  any	  JAPs	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  
we	  are	  fully	  rational	  and	  autonomous.	  	  
	  
Further,	   identifying	   WBAPs	   that	   are	   not	   JAPs	   is	   useful	   given	   that	   domains	   of	  
justice	  might	   change,	   and	  WBAPs	   that	   were	   once	   irrelevant	   from	   the	   point	   of	  
view	   of	   justice	   might	   cease	   to	   be	   so.	   In	   the	   past,	   ensuring	   access	   to	   aesthetic	  
experiences	   and	   leisure	  may	   have	   been	   considered	   to	   be	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	  
government	   activity	   –	   in	   future,	   other	   things	  might	   be	   included.	   Finally,	  whilst	  
WBAPs	  may	  not	  warrant	  direct	   state	  action,	   acknowledging	   the	   irrationality	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Khader	  2011:	  80	  
26	  However,	   whilst	   everyone	   has	  WBAPs,	   individuals	   who	   are	   subject	   to	   oppression	   are	   more	  
likely	  to	  have	  JAPs	  as	  well	  (as	  §2	  will	  discuss).	  	  
27	  Specifically,	   the	   former	   case	   may	   simply	   require	   an	   alteration	   of	   circumstances	   so	   that	   an	  
individual’s	   choices	   can	   reflect	   their	   preferences,	   whilst	   the	   latter	   may	   require	   deliberation,	  
discussion,	  and	  consciousness-­‐raising,	  alongside	  the	  provision	  of	  options.	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many	   of	   our	   preferences	   may	   guide	   individual	   behaviour:	   encouraging	   us	   to	  
critically	  reflect	  on	  our	  preferences,	  and,	  if	  we	  cannot	  find	  reasons	  for	  them	  we	  
would	  reflectively	  endorse,	  change	  them.	  Further,	  though	  it	  may	  be	  unjustifiably	  
paternalist	   for	   a	   state	   to	   interfere	   in	   an	   individual’s	  WBAP,	   if	   they	   are	  widely	  
prevalent	   the	   state	  may	   legitimately	   attempt	   to	   reduce	   this	   prevalence	   –	   for	  
example,	  with	  measures	  that	  promote	  individuals’	  capacity	  for	  reflection.28	  
	  
2.	  Perfectionism,	  Substantive	  Accounts,	  and	  Justice	  Adaptation	  
	  
2.1	  The	  Need	  for	  a	  Substantive	  Approach	  
	  
If	  our	  goal	   is	  to	  combat	  injustice,	  and	  ensure	  that	  preferences	  that	  endorse	  and	  
perpetuate	  oppression	  are	  disregarded,	  then	  a	  more	  substantive	  account	  of	  APs	  
is	  needed.	  At	   the	   far	  end	  of	   this	   spectrum	   is	  Nussbaum’s	  account,	   according	   to	  
which	  APs	  are	  simply	  those	  with	  the	  wrong	  content:	  preferences	  formed	  in	  light	  
of	  diminished	  options	   for	  what	  we	  ought	  not	   to	  prefer.29	  Hence,	   for	  Nussbaum,	  
identifying	   APs	   requires	   “a	   substantive	   theory	   of	   justice	   and	   central	   goods”30.	  
Whether	   a	  preference	   is	   rational	   or	   ‘considered’	   is	  not	  decisive	   in	  determining	  
whether	   it	   is	   reliable.	  Thus,	   if	  an	  unconsidered	  preference	   is	   for	  a	  good	  way	  of	  
life	  (say,	  economic	  empowerment)	  and	  a	  considered	  preference	  is	  not	  (physical	  
abuse),	  it	  is	  the	  former	  that	  is	  reliable.31	  
	  
Nussbaum’s	  perfectionist	  approach	  will	   certainly	  allow	  us	   to	   identify	  paradigm	  
cases,	   and	  provide	   a	   tool	   for	   combatting	   oppression.	  We	  may	  worry,	   however,	  
that	  this	  approach	  will	  be	  overly	  narrow,	   including	  as	  reliable	  only	  preferences	  
for	   what	   has	   been	   predetermined	   to	   be	   valuable.	   Thus,	   “persons	   whose	  
conceptions	   of	   the	   good	   reject	   the	   items	   on	   the	   perfectionist	   list	   will	   not	   be	  
shown	   the	   respect	   granted	   to	   those	   with	   ‘proper’	   preferences”32.	   Particularly	  
worrying	   in	   the	   current	   context,	   it	   may	   lead	   to	   the	   exclusion	   of	   disabled	  
individuals’	   preferences	   if	   disability	   is	   taken	   to	  be	   sub-­‐optimal.	   Indeed,	  Barnes	  
has	   argued	   that	   since	   “[p]hysical	   disability	   represents,	   according	   to	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  required	  by	  Colburn’s	  ‘autonomy-­‐minded	  liberalism’	  (Colburn	  2010:	  94-­‐98).	  	  
29	  Nussbaum	  2001;	  2000:	  122-­‐142.	  On	  some	   interpretations,	   this	   is	   Sen’s	  view	   too	   (e.g.	  Barnes	  
2016;	  2009a).	  However,	  Sen’s	  approach	  is	  complex	  and	  not	  always	  clearly	  defined,	  and	  I	  will	  not	  
take	  a	  stand	  on	  how	  it	  should	  best	  be	  understood	  here	  (see	  Qizilbash	  2007).	  	  
30	  Nussbaum	  2001:	  79	  
31	  E.g.	   Nussbaum	   2001:	   84.	   Given	   her	   appeal	   to	   a	   substantive	   account,	   it	   may	   seem	   that	  
Nussbaum	  is	  not	  ‘relying’	  on	  preferences	  at	  all.	  Indeed,	  they	  primarily	  play	  a	  heuristic	  role	  in	  her	  
account	  (Nussbaum	  2004:	  200;	  Begon	  2015).	  	  
32	  Terlazzo	  2014:	  186	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capabilities	  approach,	  an	  absence	  of	  one	  or	  more	  basic	  goods	   (bodily	   integrity,	  
physical	  health	  etc…)”33,	  then	  it	  “cannot	  be	  as	  optimal	  as	  a	  relevantly	  similar	  non-­‐
disabled	   life”34.	   Thus,	   disabled	   individuals’	   preferences	   for	   their	   life	   cannot	   be	  
considered	  reliable.	  As	  I	  have	  argued	  elsewhere,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  the	  capability	  
approach	   needs	   to	   evaluate	   disability	   so	   negatively.35	  Nonetheless,	   the	   general	  
worry	   remains	   that	   Nussbaum’s	   approach	   excludes	   those	   who	   dispute	   her	  
conception	   of	   value,	   and	   “counts	   a	   number	   of	   widely	   and	   sincerely-­‐held	  
conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  as	  necessarily	  non-­‐autonomous”36.	  	  
	  
In	   light	   of	   these	   problems,	   both	   Khader	   and	   Terlazzo	   offer	   substantive	  
proceduralist	   accounts	   of	   APs,	   both	   devised	   for	   the	   development	   context,	   and	  
focussing	   on	   the	   preferences	   of	   women	   in	   the	   developing	   world.	   Both	   set	  
substantive	  conditions	  on	  preference	  formation,	  but	  aim	  to	  avoid	  ruling	  out	  any	  
preferences	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   their	   content	   alone.	   Thus,	   for	   Khader,	   “APs	   are	  
preferences	  incompatible	  with	  an	  agent’s	  basic	  wellbeing…formed	  under	  unjust	  
conditions”37.	  Khader,	  then,	  is	  more	  willing	  to	  focus	  on	  content,	  seeing	  APs	  as	  any	  
“behavior	  or	  belief	  whereby	  an	  individual	  perpetuates	  her	  deprivation”,	  though	  
this	  must	   be	   “causally	   related	   to	   her	   deprivation”,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   “would	  
disappear	  upon	  exposure	  to	  superior	  conditions	  and/or	  information”38.	  As	  such,	  
we	  have	  special	  reason	  to	  worry	  about	  preferences	  with	  specific	  content	  –	  those	  
that	  perpetuate	  deprivation,	  independently	  and	  substantively	  defined	  –	  but	  they	  
are	  only	  APs	  if	  they	  arose	  in	  particular	  circumstances.	  Preferences	  formed	  in	  the	  
same	   circumstances	   but	   with	   different	   content	   are	   not	   APs	   (an	   oppressed	  
woman’s	   preference	   for	   pineapple	   over	   mango);	   nor	   are	   preferences	  
“nonconducive	   to	   basic	   flourishing” 39 	  formed	   in	   conditions	   conducive	   to	  
flourishing	  (the	  decision	  to	  endanger	  one’s	  life	  by	  engaging	  in	  extreme	  sports).	  	  
	  
Terlazzo	   argues	   that	   individuals	   should	   engage	   in	   critical	   reflection	   on	   their	  
preferences,	  and	  do	  so	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  recognised	  alternatives	  that	  should	  be	  
both	   valuable	   and	   ‘live’,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   individuals	   can	   reasonably	   see	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Barnes	  2009:	  2	  	  
34	  Barnes	  2009:	  6	  	  
35	  Begon	   2015.	   It	   is	   possible,	   though,	   that	   this	   is	   an	   implication	   of	   Nussbaum’s	   account	   (e.g.	  
Nussbaum	  2006:	  155-­‐223).	  	  
36	  Terlazzo	  2015:	  9	  
37	  Khader	  2012:	  302	  
38	  Khader	  2013:	  313	  
39	  Khader	  2011:	  17	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themselves	   exercising	   them	   given	   their	   current	   values	   and	   ambitions.40	  The	  
substantive	   conditions,	   then,	   concern	   the	   specification	   of	   these	   valuable	   live	  
options.	   Further,	   to	   meet	   the	   criteria	   of	   political	   efficacy	   she	   argues	   that	   we	  
should	  restrict	  the	  category	  of	  APs	  to	  “core	  preferences:	  that	  is,	  preferences	  that	  
are	   centrally	   important	   to	   a	   person’s	   broader	   plan	   of	   life	   or	   sense	   of	   self”41.	  
Terlazzo	   is	   particularly	   concerned	   to	   remain	  neutral	   about	   the	   content	   of	  APs,	  
but	  whilst	   she	   does	   not	   necessarily	   rule	   out	   any	   conceptions	   of	   the	   good,	   she	  
does	  contend	  that	  a	  “unifying	  characteristic”	  of	  all	  APs	  will	  be	  that	  they	  are	  ones	  
that	   people	  would	   be	   “highly	   unlikely	   to	  want	   to	   have	  were	   they	   to	   reflect	   on	  
their	  own	  preferences	  in	  a	  considered	  way	  and	  in	  better	  circumstances”42.	  This	  
may	  suggest	  an	  implicit	  judgement	  about	  their	  likely	  content.	  
	  
Both	  Khader	  and	  Terlazzo	  emphasise	  that	  having	  APs	  need	  not	  be	  irrational,	  or	  
imply	  an	  agent	  lacks	  the	  capacity	  for	  autonomy.	  Khader	  delineates	  the	  different	  
forms	  of	  AP.43	  She	  allows	   that	   individuals	  occasionally	  have	   ‘paradigmatic	  APs’,	  
wherein	   someone	   “perpetuates	   injustice	   against	   herself	   because	   of	   a	   near-­‐
completely	  distorted	  worldview”44.	  More	  often,	  though,	  individuals	  are	  mistaken	  
in	   some	  domains,	   but	   do	   not	   entirely	   lack	   the	   capacity	   for	   autonomous	   choice	  
and	  critical	  reflection.	  For	  example:	  individuals	  may	  internalise	  some	  aspects	  of	  
their	  oppression	  but	  question	  others;	  they	  may	  be	  mistaken	  about	  facts,	  but	  not	  
values;	  or	  they	  may	  engage	  in	  forced	  trade-­‐offs	  amongst	  well-­‐being	  in	  different	  
domains	   of	   their	   lives.	   Along	   similar	   lines	   Terlazzo	   emphasises	   the	   distinction	  
between	  global	  and	  local	  autonomy:	  individuals	  can	  have	  the	  global	  capacity	  for	  
autonomy	  despite	  occasional	  failures	  to	  exercise	  it	  locally.45	  
	  
Yet	  despite	  distinguishing	  the	  various	  ways	  preferences	  may	  be	  unreliable,	  these	  
approaches	   still	   aim	   to	   provide	   a	   unifying	   account,	   identifying	   a	   single	   central	  
feature	   that	   typifies	   all	   APs. 46 	  They	   make	   a	   binary	   judgement	   between	  
preferences	  that	  are	  adaptive	  and	  unreliable,	  and	  those	  that	  are	  not,	  and	  this,	   I	  
argue,	  obscures	  the	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  preferences	  may	  be	  adaptive.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Terlazzo	  2015:	  10.	  This	  substantive	  procedural	  approach	   is	   similar	   to	  one	   I	  outline	   in	  Begon	  
2015:	  248-­‐249.	  Specifically,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  valuable	  options	  individuals	  should	  reflect	  in	  light	  of	  
are	  central	  capabilities.	  	  
41	  Terlazzo	  2015:	  11	  
42	  Terlazzo	  2014:	  195	  
43	  Khader	  2013:	  317-­‐320	  
44	  Khader	  2013:	  311	  
45	  Terlazzo	  2015:	  12-­‐15.	  Also	  on	  this	  distinction,	  Colburn	  2010:	  4,	  21.	  	  
46	  This	  is	  also	  true	  of	  Barnes’s	  (2016;	  2009)	  account,	  mentioned	  above.	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2.2	  Preferences	  in	  a	  Theory	  of	  Justice	  
	  
On	  at	  least	  some	  welfarist	  accounts	  of	  distributive	  justice,	  no	  tenable	  distinction	  
can	   be	   drawn	   between	   WBAPs	   and	   JAPs:	   if	   individuals’	   interests	   directly	  
determine	   their	   entitlements,	   then	   if	   they	   are	   a	   reliable	   guide	   to	   their	   best	  
interests,	   they	   are	   also	   a	   reliable	   guide	   to	   their	   distributive	   entitlements	   (and	  
vice	  versa).	  This	  distinction	  –	  and,	  indeed,	  any	  discussion	  of	  APs	  at	  all	  –	  will	  also	  
have	  no	  role	  in,	  or	  relevance	  for,	  objectivist	  theories	  that	  understand	  individuals’	  
entitlements	   (and	   possibly	   also	   their	   well-­‐being)	   to	   be	   determined	   entirely	  
independently	   of	   their	   preferences.	   However,	   many	   theories	   of	   distributive	  
justice	  do	  not	  fall	  into	  either	  of	  these	  camps:	  whilst	  individuals’	  entitlements	  are	  
not	  reducible	  to	  what	  would	  make	  them	  happy	  or	  satisfied,	  entitlements	  are	  not	  
determined	  wholly	  independently	  of	  the	  views	  and	  values	  of	  those	  to	  whom	  they	  
are	   provided.	   In	   this	   group	  we	  might	   include	  Dworkin’s	   equality	   of	   resources,	  
Nussbaum’s	   capability	   approach,	   Arneson’s	   luck	   egalitarianism,	   Cohen’s	   equal	  
access	   to	   advantage,	   and	   Rawls’s	   theory	   of	   justice.47	  (This	   is	   not	   the	   place	   to	  
defend	  a	  substantive	  theory	  of	  justice.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  clarity	  I	  refer	  to	  Dworkin’s	  
approach,	  though	  the	  general	  claims	  apply	  to	  any	  of	  them.)	  	  
	  
Preferences	  broadly	  play	  two	  roles	  in	  such	  theories	  of	  distributive	  justice.	  First,	  
they	  play	  some	  role	  in	  determining	  the	  content	  of	  our	  distributive	  entitlements.	  
For	   Dworkin,	   we	   are	   entitled	   to	   state	   assistance	   for	   those	   disadvantages	   we	  
would	   consider	   significant	   enough	   to	   insure	   ourselves	   against.	   Thus,	   taxation	  
rates	  are	  justified	  by	  reference	  to	  a	  hypothetical	  insurance	  market,	  the	  outcome	  
of	   which	   depends	   on	   our	   particular	   tastes	   and	   ambitions. 48 	  Further,	   state	  
assistance	   should	   only	   be	   provided	   if	   individuals	   consider	   themselves	   to	   be	  
disadvantaged:	  if	  they	  consider	  some	  circumstance	  a	  matter	  of	  good	  fortune,	  we	  
should	   not	   compensate	   them	   for	   it. 49 	  APs	   can	   limit	   the	   contents	   of	   our	  
distributive	  entitlements,	  and	  the	  realm	  of	  state	  assistance:	  if	  we	  no	  longer	  saw	  
mental	   illness,	   for	  example,	  as	  something	  worth	  insuring	  against,	  we	  would	  not	  
tax	   and	   redistribute	   to	   individuals	  who	   suffer	   from	   it.	   Further,	   if	   an	   individual	  
does	  not	   consider	   themselves	  disadvantaged	  by	   their	   condition	  or	   impairment,	  
then	   they	   would	   not	   be	   entitled	   to	   pay-­‐outs	   (though	   others	   with	   the	   same	  
condition	  might	  be).50	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  E.g.	  Dworkin	  2000;	  Nussbaum	  2000;	  Arneson	  2000;	  Cohen	  1989;	  Rawls	  1999.	  	  
48	  Dworkin	  2000:	  90-­‐109	  
49	  Dworkin	  2000:	  294.	  This	  is	  ‘the	  continuity	  test’	  (Williams	  2002).	  	  
50	  In	  practice,	  Dworkin	  may	  not	  endorse	  such	  an	  individuated	  approach,	  though	  he	  acknowledges	  
it	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  this	  approach	  (Dworkin	  2002;	  Begon	  unpub.	  ms.).	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Second,	  our	  preferences	  in	  a	  particular	  case	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  make	  
use	   of	   the	   opportunities	   or	   resources	   to	   which	   we	   are	   entitled.	   Liberal	  
approaches	   are	   unlikely	   to	   compel	   individuals	   to	   function,	   both	   because	   the	  
intervention	   required	   would	   be	   illegitimately	   paternalist,	   and	   because	   an	  
individual’s	  autonomous	  decision	  not	   to	  exercise	  an	  opportunity	   legitimates	   its	  
absence.	  This	  is	  a	  central	  insight	  of	  the	  capability	  approach:	  that	  a	  starving,	  but	  
not	  a	  fasting,	  individual	  is	  necessarily	  a	  concern	  of	  justice.	  APs	  here	  may	  lead	  us	  
to	  wrongly	   consider	   self-­‐harm	   or	   self-­‐sacrifice	   to	   be	   voluntary,	   and	   hence	   not	  
unjust.	   I	   will	   now	   consider	   the	   various	   ways	   in	   which	   preferences	   may	   be	  
unreliable	  in	  either	  of	  these	  roles.	  	  
	  
2.3	  Justice	  Adaptive	  Preferences	  
	  
WBAPs	   are	   procedurally	   non-­‐autonomous	   and	   irrational,	   since	   the	   causes	   of	  
these	  preferences	  are	  necessarily	  opaque	   to	   their	  possessors.	   Some	  APs	  do	  not	  
meet	   this	   criterion,	   yet,	   nonetheless,	   should	   not	   be	   used	   to	   inform	   a	   theory	   of	  
justice:	   either	   to	   inform	   our	   general	   entitlements,	   or	   to	   justify	   self-­‐sacrifice	   as	  
voluntary.	   These	   are	   rational	   JAPs,	   and	   can	   be	   divided	   into	   three	   further	  
categories:	  non-­‐autonomous	  character	  planning	  (where	   individuals	  consciously	  
downgrade	   opportunities	   they	   have	   been	   wrongly	   denied),	   justice	   adaptive	  
choices	   (where	   individuals’	   counterfactual	   preferences	   are	   autonomous	   and	  
reliable,	   but	   their	   choices	   are	   rendered	   non-­‐autonomous	   by	   the	   limitations	   of	  
their	   circumstances),	   and	   the	   coherent	   internalisation	   of	   oppressive	   norms	  
(where	  individuals	  internalise	  a	  self-­‐conception	  according	  to	  which	  they	  are	  not	  
entitled	  to	  certain	  opportunities).	  	  
	  
First,	  non-­‐autonomous	  character	  planning.	  When	  discussing	  traditional	  accounts	  
of	   APs,	   I	   noted	   that	   they	   are	   usually	   defined	   in	   direct	   contrast	   to	   conscious,	  
rational,	   and	   autonomous	   character	   planning.	   Whilst	   the	   fox	   who	   could	   not	  
accept	  that	  the	  reason	  he	  believes	  grapes	  are	  sour	  is	  their	  inaccessibility	  is	  not	  to	  
be	  trusted,	  this	  is	  not	  true	  of	  the	  fox	  who	  consciously	  cultivates	  a	  preference	  for	  
sweeter,	   lower-­‐hanging	   fruit.	  However,	   this	  example	   is	  misleading.	  Consciously	  
revising	  our	  preferences	  in	  light	  of	  diminished	  options	  can	  be	  autonomous,	  but	  it	  
need	  not	  be,	  depending	  on	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  our	  options	  are	  constrained.	  For	  
example,	   someone	   who	   has	   adapted	   to	   ableist	   biases	   in	   hiring	   practices,	   and	  
concluded	  that	  they	  do	  not	  really	  need	  opportunities	   for	  meaningful	  work,	  may	  
prioritise	   personal	   relationships	   and	   hobbies	   instead.	   Further,	   they	   may	   be	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aware	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  this	  change	  of	  priorities,	  or	  would	  not	  repudiate	  them	  if	  
they	  were.	  Such	  preferences	  are	  rational,	  and	  do	  not	  demonstrate	  a	  failure	  in	  the	  
individual’s	  autonomous	  capacities.	  Indeed,	  these	  preferences	  may	  function	  as	  a	  
reliable	  guide	  to	  their	  interests	  (in	  these	  unjust	  circumstances).	  Nonetheless,	  we	  
surely	   should	   not	   use	   them	   to	   conclude	   either	   that	   the	   opportunity	   for	  
meaningful	   employment	   is,	   in	   general,	   not	   a	   concern	   of	   justice,	   or	   that	   this	  
individual	  has	  voluntarily	  chosen	  to	  forgo	  this	  opportunity.	  	  
	  
This	   preference	   is	   not	   autonomous,	   then,	   not	   because	   the	   individual	   is	   a	  
defective	  agent,	  who	  lacks,	  or	  has	  misused,	  the	  capacity	  for	  autonomous	  choice.	  
Rather,	   their	   circumstances	   prevent	   them	   from	   being	   autonomous:	   from	  
deciding	  for	  themselves	  what	  is	  valuable,	  and	  being	  able	  to	  pursue	  it.	  Specifically,	  
it	   seems	   these	   circumstances	   undercut	   individuals’	   independence:	   they	   are	  
subject	  to	  factors	  that	  undermine	  their	  ability	  to	  ‘decide	  for	  themselves’.51	  Yet	  in	  
this	   case,	   their	   independence	   is	   not	   undermined	   by	   covert	   influences	   (as	   §1.2	  
considered)	  but	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  acceptable	  alternatives,	  which	  the	  agent	  may	  be	  well	  
aware	  of.	  	  	  
	  
The	   second	   set	   of	   rational	   JAPs	   can	   be	   called	   ‘justice	   adaptive	   choices’.	  When	  
individuals	   engage	   in	   character	   planning,	   their	   underlying	   preferences	   change.	  
However,	   as	   §1.2	   discussed,	   there	   are	   also	   cases	   in	   which	   we	   can	   distinguish	  
what	   people	   choose	   (given	   limited	   options)	   and	   what	   they	   counterfactually	  
prefer.	   For	   example,	   in	   the	   earlier	   case,	   an	   individual	   chose	   not	   to	   partake	   in	  
higher	   education	   whilst	   preferring	   that	   it	   were	   available	   in	   a	   more	   accessible	  
form.	  Again,	  individuals’	  choices	  in	  these	  cases	  are	  rational,	  and	  reflect	  a	  capacity	  
for	  autonomous	  choice.	  Yet,	  again,	  their	  circumstances	  prevent	  them	  from	  being	  
autonomous.	  	  
	  
It	  may	  seem	  that,	  in	  this	  case,	  individuals	  do	  not	  really	  have	  adaptive	  preferences	  
at	  all,	  since	  their	  counterfactual	  preferences	  are	  autonomous,	  and	  reliable	  from	  
the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   justice.	   This	   is	   certainly	   true,	   and	   it	   is	   important	   to	  
acknowledge	  that	  when	  options	  are	  constrained,	  an	  individuals’	  choice	  may	  only	  
reflect	  their	  preferences	  in	  a	  very	  local	  sense.	  Further,	  that	  their	  counterfactual	  
preferences	   can	   inform	   a	   theory	   of	   justice:	   we	   have	   no	   reason	   to	   doubt	   their	  
testimony	   in	  determining	   an	   account	   of	   our	   general	   entitlements.	  Nonetheless,	  
sometimes	   individuals’	   choices	   are	   the	   only	   guidance	  we	   have	   regarding	   their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  independence	  and	  its	  importance	  for	  autonomy,	  see	  Colburn	  (2011:	  26-­‐31).	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preferences,	   and	   when	   they	   are	   rendered	   non-­‐autonomous	   in	   this	   way,	   they	  
should	  be	  deemed	  justice	  adaptive:	  they	  should	  not	  be	  used	  to	  suggest	  that	  what	  
they	   choose	   to	   forgo	   is	   generally	   unimportant,	   or	   that	   their	   lack	   of	   it	   was	   a	  
voluntary	  sacrifice.	  For	  example,	   if	  an	   individual	  with	  a	  mobility	   impairment	   is	  
forced	  to	  choose	  between	  modifying	  their	  home	  so	  they	  can	  move	  around	  it	  more	  
easily,	  and	  pursuing	  leisure	  activities,	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  choose	  the	  former	  is	  not	  
evidence	  that	  they	  dispute	  the	  value	  of	  leisure	  time	  in	  human	  life,	  nor	  that	  they	  
have	  voluntarily	  chosen	  not	  to	  pursue	  it.	  	  
	  
Third,	  and	  finally,	  are	  cases	  involving	  the	  coherent	  internalisation	  of	  oppressive	  
norms.	   These	   are	   preferences	   borne	   out	   of	  mistreatment	   and	  manipulation	   so	  
comprehensive	   that	   individuals	   would	   not	   repudiate	   the	   cause	   of	   their	  
preference	   if	   they	   were	   aware	   of	   it,	   and	   it	   does	   not	   conflict	   with	   their	   other	  
beliefs	  and	  preferences.	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  if	  the	  above	  sexist	  science	  teacher	  
was	  sufficiently	  successful	  that,	  on	  being	  made	  aware	  of	  the	  reasons	  we	  gave	  up	  
science,	  we	  would	  say	   the	   teacher	  did	   the	  right	   thing,	  since	  science,	  after	  all,	   is	  
‘not	   for	  women’.	  As	  §1.2	  considered,	   these	  preferences	  might	  be	  a	  guide	  to	  our	  
best	  interests	  in	  light	  of	  our	  preference	  set.	  Nonetheless,	  though	  this	  influence	  on	  
our	  preferences	  is	  not	  covert	  (we	  are	  not	  necessarily	  unconscious	  of	  it)	  it	  surely	  
violates	   any	   plausible	   interpretation	   of	   the	   independence	   condition,	   and	   so	  
cannot	   be	   considered	   autonomous.	   As	   such,	   these	   preferences	   should	   not	  
determine	   individuals’	   distributive	   entitlements	   at	   either	   the	   general	   or	  
individual	  level.	  	  
	  
JAPs	  need	  not	  also	  be	  WBAPs,	  then,	  but	  of	  course	  they	  can	  be.	  The	  inaccessibility	  
of	  grapes	  may	  not	  be	  a	  concern	  of	  justice,	  but	  many	  preferences	  that	  arise	  as	  the	  
result	  of	  covert	  influences	  are	  relevant	  to	  justice.	  WBAPs	  are	  also	  JAPs	  when	  the	  
diminished	  options	   to	  which	   individuals	   irrationally	  adapt	  occur	   in	  domains	  of	  
their	   life	   over	   which	   they	   ought,	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   justice,	   to	   be	   able	   to	   exercise	  
autonomy	   and	   pursue	   their	   own	   conception	   of	   the	   good.	   For	   example,	   a	   deaf	  
individuals’	   preferences	   not	   to	   listen	   to	   music	   and	   not	   to	   be	   able	   to	   engage	  
politically	  might	  both	  be	  WBAPs,	  but	  only	  the	  latter	  is	  also	  a	  JAP.	  Thus,	  it	  should	  
again	  be	   emphasised,	   that	  whilst	  we	   are	   all	   likely	   to	  have	  WBAPs,	   for	   those	   in	  
unjust	  circumstances	  these	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  JAPs	  too.	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2.4	  Responding	  to	  JAPs	  
	  
Different	   forms	  of	   intervention	  are	   called	   for	  depending	  on	   the	   sense	   in	  which	  
individuals’	   preferences	   are	   adaptive.	   First,	   when	   only	   individuals’	   choices	   are	  
adaptive	  (and	  their	  counterfactual	  preferences	  are	  reliable),	  our	  focus	  should	  be	  
providing	  the	  acceptable	  alternatives	  they	  lack.	  Moreover,	  we	  should	  engage	  in	  a	  
process	   of	   deliberation	   with	   the	   affected	   individuals	   to	   determine	   what	   the	  
content	  of	  these	  alternatives	  should	  be,	  since	  we	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  discount	  their	  
counterfactual	  preferences.	  Thus,	   the	   state	   should	  not	   intervene	   in	   individuals’	  
adaptive	   choices	   (on	   the	   grounds	   that	   they	   are	   adaptive	   choices),	   but	   should	  
provide	   the	   conditions	   so	   that	   they	   can	   choose	   in	   a	   way	   that	   reflects	   their	  
underlying	  preferences.	  	  
	  
However,	   in	   at	   least	   some	   cases	   of	   non-­‐autonomous	   character	   planning,	   the	  
coherent	  internalisation	  of	  oppressive	  norms,	  and	  irrational	  JAPs,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  
the	  provision	  of	   further	  options	  will	  be	   insufficient.	   In	   these	   cases,	   individuals’	  
adaptation	   to	   diminished	   options	   may	   have	   lead	   to	   some	   degree	   of	   value	  
distortion:	  those	  who	  have	  undergone	  non-­‐autonomous	  character	  planning	  have	  
consciously	  devalued	  the	  opportunities	  they	  have	  been	  deprived	  off;	  those	  who	  
have	   undergone	   the	   coherent	   internalisation	   of	   oppressive	   norms	   have	  
internalised	  a	  conception	  of	  themselves	  as	  not	  entitled	  to	  various	  opportunities;	  
and	  those	  who	  have	  irrational	  JAPs	  reject	  certain	  opportunities	  for	  reasons	  they	  
could	  not,	  themselves,	  accept.	  I	  noted	  two	  ways	  in	  which	  preferences	  might	  play	  
a	  role	  in	  a	  theory	  of	  justice,	  and	  value	  distortions	  can	  occur	  that	  undermine	  both	  
these	   roles:	   they	  may	   affect	   the	   content	   of	   our	   general	   entitlements,	   and	   they	  
may	  cast	  doubt	  on	  whether	  an	  instance	  of	  self-­‐deprivation	  is	  really	  voluntary.	  	  
	  
First,	  then,	  an	  individual	  may	  repudiate	  the	  value	  of	  an	  opportunity	  or	  resource	  
entirely.	  Such	  a	  preference	  would	  take	  the	  form:	  ‘I	  live	  well	  without	  x,	  so	  x	  cannot	  
be	   essential	   to	   a	   decent	   life’.	   For	   example,	   autistic	   individuals	   may	   question	  
whether	   certain	   forms	   of	   social	   interaction	   are	   as	   essential	   as	   neurotypical	  
individuals	  assume,	  deaf	  individuals	  may	  question	  whether	  hearing	  is	  essential,	  
and	  paraplegic	   individuals	  may	  doubt	   the	   importance	  of	  being	  able	   to	  walk.	   In	  
determining	   the	   content	   of	   our	   distributive	   entitlements,	   we	  may	   not	  want	   to	  
allow	   individuals	   who	   have	   not	   experienced	   some	   opportunity	   to	   veto	   its	  
inclusion.	   For	   example,	   disabled	   individuals	   who	   reject	   the	   value	   of	   work,	  
education,	  or	  relationships	  simply	  because	  they	  have	  been	  deprived	  of	   them	  as	  
the	   result	   of	   ableist	   biases	   should	   not	   lead	   us	   to	   conclude	   that	   these	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opportunities	  are	  not	  a	  concern	  of	  justice.	  However,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  if	  our	  
just	  entitlements	  are	  conceptualised	  at	  a	  relatively	  high	  level	  of	  abstraction	  (as	  I	  
contend	   they	   should	   be52),	   then	   individuals	   who	   repudiate,	   for	   example,	   the	  
importance	   of	   being	   able	   to	  walk	   or	   hear	   do	   not	   threaten	   agreement	   on	   their	  
content.	   The	   relevant	   opportunities	   here	   are	   for	   mobility	   and	   aesthetic	  
experience,	   and	   these	   individuals	  have	  not	  been	  deprived	  of	   these	   capabilities,	  
nor	  do	  they	  repudiate	  their	  value.	  	  
	  
Moreover,	   individuals	   with	   APs	   do	   not	   tend	   to	   reject	   the	   importance	   of	   some	  
opportunity	   in	   general,	   they	   merely	   repudiate	   its	   value	   in	   their	   life.	   Such	  
preferences	  might	   take	   the	   form:	   ‘x	   might	   be	   good	   for	   others,	   but	   it’s	   not	   for	  
people	   like	   me	   –	   and	   I’m	   happy	   without	   it’.	   For	   example,	   an	   individual	   with	  
Down’s	  syndrome	  might	   take	   the	  view	  that	  education	   is	  valuable,	  but	  conclude	  
that	   ‘it’s	   not	   for	   them’	   if	   their	   educative	   environment	   is	   not	   an	   inclusive	   one.	  
These	   individuals’	  preferences	  can	  be	  used	  to	  determine	  the	  opportunities	   that	  
are	  relevant	  to	  justice,	  but	  should	  not	  be	  used	  as	  evidence	  that	  an	  individual	  has	  
what	  they	  are	  entitled	  to:	  the	  individual	  with	  Down’s	  does	  not	  dispute	  the	  value	  
of	  education,	  but	  their	  ‘choice’	  not	  to	  engage	  in	  it	  should	  not	  lead	  us	  to	  conclude	  
that	   justice	  has	  been	  done.	  A	  voluntary	   choice	   to	   reject	   an	  option	   requires	  not	  
just	   that	   acceptable	   alternatives	   are	   available,	   but	   that	   these	   choices	   are	  
considered	   live	   options.	   Individuals	   need,	   in	   Nussbaum’s	   terminology,	   the	  
‘internal	  capability’	  to	  exercise	  an	  opportunity,53	  as	  well	  as	  the	  mere	  freedom	  to	  
do	  so.	  Exactly	  how	  these	  meaningful	  opportunities	  can	  be	  provided	  is	  a	  complex	  
question,	   and	   will	   likely	   require	   some	   form	   of	   deliberation	   with	   affected	  
individuals,	  which	  involves	  consciousness-­‐raising	  (such	  that	  they	  understand	  the	  
significance	   and	   potential	   value	   of	   certain	   options)	   as	  well	   as	   the	   provision	   of	  
opportunities.	  	  	  
	  
Justice	   adaptive	   choices,	   then,	   can	   be	   avoided	   by	   providing	   individuals	   with	  
options	   that	   reflect	   their	   preferences,	   where	   they	   are	   entitled	   to	   these	   as	   a	  
matter	   of	   justice.	   Other	   JAPs	   arise	   from	   value	   distortions,	   and	   avoiding	   these	  
requires	   both	   that	   individuals	   have	   acceptable	   options	   open	   to	   them,	   so	   their	  
values	   are	   not	   distorted	   by	   a	   lack	   of	   exposure	   to	   reasonable	   alternatives,	   and	  
being	  taught	  to	  see	  why	  these	  options	  might	  be	  valuable	  and	  to	  see	  themselves	  
as	  the	  kind	  of	  people	  who	  can	  exercise	  them.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  Begon	  2017	  
53	  E.g.	  Nussbaum	  2011:	  20-­‐23	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Finally,	   it	   should	   be	   emphasised	   that,	   though	   APs	   are	   non-­‐autonomous,	  
diagnosing	  someone	  as	  having	  one	  need	  not	  be	  insulting.54	  First,	  having	  rational	  
JAPs	   does	   not	   indicate	   any	   lack	   of	   the	   internal	   capacities	   for	   autonomy:	   the	  
problem	   lies	   in	   circumstances.	   Second,	   having	   a	   value	   distortion	   on	   some	  
particular	   issue	   does	   not	   imply	   an	   individual	   is	  wholly	   unreliable,	   or	   lacks	   the	  
capacity	  to	  make	  autonomous	  choices	  or	  form	  reliable	  preferences	  in	  any	  area	  of	  
their	  life.	  Finally,	  though	  irrational	  JAPs	  do	  indicate	  flawed	  reasoning,	  it	  does	  not	  
follow	  that	  their	  possessors	  are	  unusually	   irrational	  or	  incapable	  of	  formulating	  
consistent	  preferences.	  We	  all	  adapt	  to	  restrictions	  in	  our	  options,	  and	  many	  of	  
us	   do	   so	   in	   non-­‐autonomous	   ways	   (we	   have	   WBAPs).	   However,	   when	   these	  
restrictions	   stem	   from	  oppression	   and	  mistreatment,	   the	   resulting	   adaptations	  
are	   more	   likely	   to	   be	   a	   concern	   of	   justice	   (JAPs).	   The	   fault,	   though,	   lies	   in	  
circumstances	   rather	   than	   individuals.	   The	   reason	   individuals	   in	   unjust	  
circumstances	  are	  more	  prone	  to	  JAPs	  is	  not	  that	  they	  are	  more	  defective	  agents.	  	  
	  
3.	  Conclusion	  	  
	  
I	  began	  this	  paper	  with	  a	  dilemma	  that	  discussions	  of	  AP	  raise:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  
we	   do	   not	  want	   to	   disregard	   the	   preferences	   of	   oppressed	   groups,	   and	   ignore	  
their	   members	   as	   untrustworthy	   agents,	   yet	   on	   the	   other,	   we	   do	   not	   want	   to	  
allow	   that	   cases	   in	   which	   individuals	   have	   adapted	   to	   deprivation	   no	   longer	  
constitute	   an	   injustice.	   I	   have	   argued	   that	   it	   is	   only	   JAPs	   that	   should	   be	  
considered	  unreliable	  in	  the	  context	  of	  social	   justice,	  and	  that	  JAPs	  need	  not	  be	  
irrational.	  When	  disabled	  individuals’	  preferences	  are	  JAPs,	  this	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  
result	   of	   their	   circumstances,	   which,	   insofar	   as	   this	   is	   possible,	   should	   be	  
changed.	  We	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  disabled	  individuals	  are	  unusually	  deficient	  
in	  autonomy,	  or	  more	  prone	  than	  others	  to	  adapting	  to	  their	  circumstances,	  and	  
we	   should	  not	  dismiss	   the	  preferences	  of	   any	   individual	   or	   group	  out	   of	   hand.	  
However,	  we	  are	  in	  danger	  of	  perpetuating	  injustice	  if	  we	  fail	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  
ways	  in	  which	  restrictions	  of	  individuals’	  options	  can	  undermine	  their	  ability	  to	  
form	   autonomous	   preferences	   in	   areas	   relevant	   to	   justice,	   and	   prevent	   them	  
from	   effectively	   pursuing	   those	   options	   they	   prefer,	   and	   should	   be	   entitled	   to.	  
Thus,	   when	   preferences	   are	   justice	   adaptive,	   they	   should	   not	   determine	   the	  
contents	   of	   our	   distributive	   entitlements,	   nor	   determine	  whether	   a	   sacrifice	   is	  
voluntary.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  I	   do	   not	  mean	   to	   downplay	   individuals’	   experiences,	   and	   do	   not	   deny	   that	   (especially	   given	  
currently	  unjust	  social	  circumstances)	  this	  may	  be	  experienced	  as	  insulting.	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